INTRODUCTION
We consider a broad class of situations where a society must choose from a finite set of alternatives, and we provide a full characterization of the set of strategy-proof social choice functions under such situations. Our class includes, along with many others, the polar cases where the preferences of agents are completely unrestricted and where these preferences are article no. ET972301 single-peaked in one dimension. Our general characterization implies, as corollaries, the impossibility theorem of Gibbard and Satterthwaite, as well as Moulin's characterization of strategy-proof voting schemes on the line. Hence, results that have been widely perceived as very different appear here as the common consequence of some fundamental facts. These are, first, that strategy-proof mechanisms must be based on an appropriate generalization of the median voter rule and, second, that they must satisfy the intersection property.
This condition, to be described below, becomes increasingly stringent and forces dictatorship as the preference domain is enlarged. Consequently positive results only arise under very strong domain restrictions. On balance our results confirm the widespread pessimism that exists about the possibility of designing strategy-proof mechanisms.
A society must choose from a finite set of alternatives, and each alternative : can be described as a K-tuple of integer values (: 1 , ..., : K ), with each : k belonging to a pre-specified integer interval [a k , b k ]. Each dimension k stands for one possible relevant characteristic of our alternatives, the elements in the integer interval [a k , b k ] describe the levels at which the k th characteristic may be satisfied, and alternatives can be identified by the levels (: 1 , ..., : K ) at which they perform on each of the characteristics. For example, a firm may have to choose sets of employees from a given set of applicants K=[1, 2, ..., K]. Since each subset of K may be described by its characteristic function, subsets of applicants can be identified with K-tuples in B=> K k=1 [0, 1] , with : k =0 if the k th applicant is not chosen and : k =1 if he is. Since modeling alternatives for collective choice as multidimensional vectors has a long tradition in economics and political science, the reader will find many other situations where to apply this basic framework. Yet, our analysis does not cover all types of multidimensional alternatives. Consistency with some of the assumptions to come make it best to consider interpretations where a higher level of the characteristic is not necessarily associated to higher satisfaction for the voter. Locational characteristics are a good example of cases we cover. Amounts spent on public goods are not, but other qualitative features of a public project may well be encompassed.
What is specific to our paper is the incorporation of different types of constraints to collective decision-making. The firm in our example may have a limited number of vacancies, say three. Some of these vacancies, say one, may have to be filled necessarily, while the others may or may not, depending on the quality of applicants. Thus, although any subset of applicants is a potential or conceivable alternative, only subsets with at least one applicant and at most three are feasible. Thus, alternatives will typically belong to a Cartesian product (also called a box), but the range of feasible alternatives will typically not be a Cartesian product itself.
We investigate the set of strategy-proof social choice functions selecting feasible alternatives, when the preferences of voters satisfy a generalized version of single-peakedness. When all K-tuples of characteristics are feasible, this set is known to coincide with the family of all generalized median voter schemes (BarberaÁ , Gul and Stacchetti [2] ). We prove (Theorem 3) that these methods are still the only possible candidates for strategy-proof decision making in our setting. Those are based on a strong form of decentralized decision-making: a value is selected for each of the characteristics describing alternatives, and then the alternative jointly defined by these independently selected values is the recommended social outcome. To what extent can we still use generalized median voter schemes to make social choices when feasibility restrictions preclude some K-tuples of values as possible outcomes?. Of course, if we allow agents to vote for unfeasible alternatives in the range of a given generalized median voter scheme f, then unfeasible recommendations will emerge. Moreover, even if agents are restricted to vote for feasible alternatives, some combinations of individually admissible votes may result in unfeasible collective recommendations. Whether or not this problem arises depends jointly on the shape of the feasible set and on the specific generalized median voter scheme under consideration. We prove (Theorem 1) that generalized median voter schemes respect feasibility if and only if they satisfy the intersection property. The set of such generalized median voter schemes constitutes the class of all strategy-proof social choice functions under the strong assumption that the domain of preferences only includes singlepeaked preferences whose top alternative is feasible. The intersection property is automatically satisfied if the set of feasible outcomes is Cartesian, but otherwise becomes very stringent. For many shapes of the feasible set it precipitates impossibility results. In other cases, nontrivial social choice functions satisfy the intersection property. Yet, these positive cases should be qualified, because they may not be robust to relaxations of the strong assumption that the only admissible preferences are those with feasible tops. At any rate, our unified treatment identifies the intersection property as a condition to be met, and provides a systematic approach to discover the structure of strategy-proof social choice functions under any type of constraints.
The role of single-peakedness in avoiding strategic manipulations is already mentioned in Black's [5] seminal article. Moulin [12] proved that generalized median voter schemes on the real line were the only strategy-proof mechanisms among those requiring agents to reveal only their preferred alternative. BarberaÁ and Jackson [4] extended the analysis to cover all closed ranges. In that more general setting, they also proved that, in fact, dropping the``tops only'' requirement does not enlarge the set of strategy-proof mechanisms, a fact already proven by Sprumont [15] for the real line.
The first extensions of these results from one to several dimensions are due to Laffond [10] , Chichilnisky and Heal [8] and Border and Jordan [6] . The papers by BarberaÁ , Sonnenschein and Zhou [3] , BarberaÁ , Gul and Stacchetti [2] , Bossert and Weymark [7] , Le Breton and Sen [11] and Serizawa [14] are those having a closer relationship to the present work, but only cover the case where the range is a Cartesian product. Our proofs cannot rely on previous results, because the non-cartesian form of the range raises new difficulties. Yet, some steps follow lines similar to those in BarberaÁ and Peleg [1] and BarberaÁ , Sonnenschein and Zhou [3] .
The paper is organized as follows. After notation and definitions, Section 2 presents the notion of a generalized median voter scheme. Section 3 provides the characterization of generalized median voter schemes leading to feasible outcomes when individual votes respect feasibility. Section 4 then shows that generalized median voter schemes are in fact the only strategy-proof mechanisms in our setting. The aim of Section 5 is to show that the Gibbard Satterthwaite Theorem is an immediate consequence of our results. Finally, an Appendix at the end of the paper contains some of the proofs.
PRELIMINARIES: GENERALIZED MEDIAN VOTER SCHEMES
Agents are the elements of a finite set N=[1, 2, ..., n]. We assume that n is at least 2.
Alternatives are K-tuples of integer numbers. For integers a, b # Z, with a<b, we will denote the integer interval Preferences are binary relations on alternatives. Let U be the set of complete, transitive and asymmetric preferences on B. Preferences in U are denoted by P, P$, P i , P$ i , ... . For P # U, A B, we denote the alternative in A most preferred by P as { A (P), and we call it the top of P on A. { B (P)# {(P) will be called the unconstrained top of P.
Preference profiles are n-tuples of preferences on B, P # U n . Profiles P=(P 1 , ..., P n ) are also represented by (P i , P &i ) when we want to stress the role of i 's preference. In particular, (P i , P &i ) and (P$ i , P &i ) will stand for two profiles which differ in i 's preference and are otherwise identical.
A social choice function on P U is a function F: P n Ä B.
Definition 1. The social choice function F: P n Ä B respects voter's sovereignty on A B if for every : # A there exists P # P n such that F(P)=:.
The range of a social choice function F: P n Ä B, is denoted by R F . That is, R F =[: # B | there exists P=(P 1 , ..., P n ) # P n such that F (P)=:]. We will often start from social choice functions defined on domains P n and then consider the restriction of F on subsets of P n . When this domain restriction occurs, we identify the restriction of F with itself.
Social choice functions require each agent to report some preference. A social choice function is strategy-proof if it is always in the best interest of agents to reveal their preferences truthfully. Formally, Definition 2. A social choice function F: P n Ä B is manipulable on P U if there exists P=(P 1 , ..., P n ) # P n , i # N and P$ i # P such that F(P$ i , P &i ) P i F (P). A social choice function is strategy-proof on P if it is not manipulable on P .
The preferences of voters are assumed to be strict and to respect a generalized notion of single-peakedness. The preferences P of any voter must be such that they have a unique maximal element {(P) on B, and whenever alternative : is on a minimal path from ; to {(P) (and thus closer than ; to the best alternative) then :P;. This restriction coincides with the classical notion of single-peakedness when alternatives are one dimensional and preferences are strict. It constitutes a natural extension of single-peakedness to our framework.
We denote by P the set of all multidimensional single-peaked preferences on B; P(:)=[P # P | {(P)=:] is the set of all such preferences whose top is :. For A B, P(A) is the set of all single-peaked preferences with top on A, that is P(A)= : # A P(:). We refer to P(A) as the set of preferences closed on A. Notice that P(B)=P.
We want to single out a special class of social choice functions having the informationally nice property that they only require agents to reveal what is their preferred alternative on the range of the function.
We will say colloquially that voting schemes have the``tops-only'' property. Notice that our definition is relative to the range R F of the function. Thus, two preferences P, P$ on B with the same top {(P)={(P$) outside of R F may lead to different choices under F, if their tops on the range { R F (P) and { R F (P$) are not the same. Therefore, to any voting scheme F : P n Ä B we can associate a function f : R n F Ä R F defined by
for (P 1 , ..., P n ) # P n . From now on, when this does not lead to confusion, we shall abuse language and also call such a function a voting scheme. When we say then that the voting scheme f : R n F Ä R F is strategy-proof on P we mean that the social choice function F: P n Ä B (uniquely) associated with f is strategyproof on P .
We close this section by defining generalized median voter schemes. One description is based on the notion of left-coalition systems. For each dimension k, each set of voters l and each value ! # [a k , b k ] in its range of definition on that dimension, a left-coalition system L k indicates whether or not that set of voters, or coalition, belongs to the system at this given value. If it does (l # L(!)), this means that the coalition can guarantee the choice of a value not higher than ! whenever the vote of all members on that dimension is less than or equal to !. For this interpretation to be consistent, some natural conditions are required from left-coalition systems. Any left-coalition system generates a unique social choice function on an integer interval, through the following procedure: agents declare their preferred value in the interval, and the chosen value is the (unique) ! having the property that the set of agents voting for values below or equal to ! belongs to the coalition system, while the set of those voting for values strictly below ! does not belong. A similar description can be provided through the symmetric concept of a right-coalition system.
is a correspondence C k that assigns to every : k # B k a collection of non-empty coalitions C k (: k ) satisfying the following conditions:
L will refer to a family of left-coalition systems and R to a family of right-coalition systems. Moreover l k (: k ) will denote an element of L k (: k ) and r k (: k ) an element of R k (: k ). However, : k and k will be omitted when no confusion may arise. 
) be a family of left (right)-coalition systems on B. The voting scheme f : R n F Ä B defined as follows:
It is clear that either left or right coalition systems can be taken as the primitive concept for the definition of a generalized median voter scheme. Proposition 1 gives us the exact connection between the left and right coalition systems associated with a given generalized median voter scheme. This connection will be used extensively in the sequel. Proposition 1. Let f : R n F Ä R F be a generalized median voter scheme defined by L and also by R. For every k=1, 2, ..., K let
for every a k <: k b k , and
Then, for every k=1, ...,
Proof. See the Appendix.
Before finishing this section we would like to single out the class of neutral and anonymous generalized median voter schemes: voting by quota. A generalized median voter scheme f is voting by quota if the left (right) coalition system L(R) that defines it has the following properties, for every k=1, ..., K:
. It is easy to see, by using Proposition 1, that the relationship between the left quotas (Q l k ) and the right quotas (Q r k ) defining a quota system is the following:
ADMISSIBLE COALITION STRUCTURES UNDER CONSTRAINTS: A CHARACTERIZATION RESULT
Consider the problem of selecting a specific mechanism to achieve the type of collective decisions under consideration. First, there is the question whether we want to look for any type of procedure, or restrict attention to generalized median voter schemes. Our results in Section 4 will prove that, if we are interested in strategy proofness, we should stick to generalized median voter schemes.
But suppose, now, that we know about some a priori feasibility constraints. Say that, while the box B describes the set of conceivable alternatives, only those in A/B are actually feasible outcomes. Now the possible choice for the designer must be reassessed in several directions: the picture changes quite dramatically.
First of all, notice that letting agents vote for unfeasible alternatives would easily lead to recommend unfeasible results, since generalized median voter schemes respect unanimity. Thus, we must require agents to vote for feasible alternatives only. But even then, not any generalized median voter scheme will do. Depending on the shape of the set A, and on the structure of the left (or right) coalition system defining f, it may well be, as Example 1 below illustrates, that f would recommend an unfeasible outcome even if each individual voted for a feasible one. When f always chooses a feasible outcome, as long as agents vote for feasible ones, we say that f respects feasibility for A under the aggregation process. A designer who is informed of feasibility constraints should concentrate attention on feasibility respecting mechanisms. Notice that any generalized median voter scheme will respect feasibility whenever A is a subbox of B.
Suppose then, that given a feasible set A, we take any generalized median voter scheme f respecting feasibility for A. Can we guarantee that f will be strategy-proof on the domain of all single-peaked preferences? Not quite! Remember that now we are requiring agents to vote for their top on the range, and no longer for their unconditionally best alternative. Generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof when the top alternative of single-peaked agents is feasible and therefore voting for the unrestricted and the restricted top is the same. Otherwise, there would be room for manipulation, as shown by Example 2.
Suppose that the generalized median voter scheme is voting by right quota 2 (as in Example 1). Let P 1 and P 2 be preferences in P with {(P 1 )=(0, 0) and {(P 2 )=(0, 1). Let P 3 and P$ 3 be the following preferences for agent 3: (1, 1) P 3 (1, 0) P 3 (0, 1) P 3 (0, 0) and (0, 1) P$ 3 (0, 0) P$ 3 (1, 1) P$ 3 (1, 0). Notice that { A (P 3 )=(1, 0) and { A (P$ 3 )={(P$ 3 )=(0, 1). Yet F is not strategy-proof since (0, 1)=F(P 1 , P 2 , P$ 3 ) P 3 F(P 1 , P 2 , P 3 )=(0, 0). However, F is strategy-proof if we let the set of admissible preferences to be exactly P(A).
What happens is that single-peakedness does not restrict too much the direction of preferences among alternatives that are not top, unless they lie in rather specific positions. Because of that, the strength of single-peakedness depends on the shape of A. We may even have, as an extreme case, a set A/B and a class P of single-peaked preferences on B, such that any conceivable ordering of the elements of A is the restriction on A of some single-peaked preferences in P with top in A.
Because of the above, each of our statements must be qualified with reference to the set of preferences where it applies, which in turn is linked to the set of alternatives that are a priori feasible. Given a set A of feasible alternatives, we focus on the domain P(A)=P . Remember (see Section 2) that this is the set of single-peaked preferences closed on A, that is, the set of all preferences whose unconditional top is an element of A. Clearly, our positive results would still hold if domains were restricted further, but not if we enlarge them to allow for preferences with unfeasible tops. Since it is often the case that we prefer what we can not get, our preference domains are very narrow indeed. This is the major reason why overall conclusions have negative flavor.
When characterizing feasibility preserving voting schemes, we'll look for schemes respecting voter's sovereignty on A. This is very natural in our context, since any reason why a feasible alternative should not be in the range could be taken into account as still another form of unfeasibility.
In order to motivate the form of our results, consider the minimal box B containing A, a point : in the box but not in A, and a set S A. If we can choose a distribution of agents with tops in S A whose joint vote under f would lead to :, then f is not feasibility preserving. We look for a condition implying that such distribution cannot be found for any S A and any : in the minimal box B (clearly, outcomes outside B will never emerge). Our characterization comes in two parts. We first present a condition, the intersection property, which f must satisfy for any : Â A, S A in order to preserve feasibility. The intersection property guarantees some coordination among the decisions taken on each separate dimension by requiring that certain agents belong simultaneously to different coalitions whose separate power could otherwise lead to unfeasible outcomes. Our second result sharpens the above requirement: for each :, there is one set S A, the crucial set, such that, if the intersection property holds for : and S , then it also holds for : and any S A. This implies a considerable simplification in the practical use of the condition. We now proceed formally.
For :, ;
be the sets of dimensions in which the components of ; are strictly greater or smaller than those of :, respectively. Definition 9. Let A B and let f : A n Ä B be a generalized median voter scheme defined by L and R. Let : Â A and S A. We say that f has the Intersection Property for (:, S) iff for every r(:
, the right or left coalitions selected for this dimension do not play any role in the condition.
We will say that f has the Intersection Property if it has it for every (:, S) # (B&A, 2 A ).
Theorem
Notice that, when A is a Cartesian product, any choice of values in each of the dimensions leads to a feasible alternative. Hence, the intersection property should not and does not impose any restriction when ranges are Cartesian. Depending on the structure of the set of alternatives the property becomes a more or less stringent requirement. Section 5 includes a proof of the Gibbard Satterthwaite Theorem based on the family of conditions on left and right coalitions imposed by the intersection property.
Given a feasible set A, an unfeasible alternative : Â A, and a social choice function f, whether or not the intersection property holds would in principle involve calculations for any subset S of A. Our next result will prove that, in fact, one may restrict attention to a single S, what we call the crucial S for :. From now on, we will often identify, without loss of generality, the vector : Â B&A with the vector (0, ..., 0).
We say that v T+1 is redundant for S if for every generalized median voter scheme f respecting voter's sovereignty on Theorem 2. For any generalized median voter scheme f and every : # B&A, there is a unique crucial set S (up to a support transformation) such that f satisfies the intersection property for any (:, S) if and only if it satisfies it for (:, S ).
Proof. See the
Example 3. A family of problems will arise from cases like the following: a municipality must choose a mix of projects with different levels of intensity. We can represent the conceivable courses of action as K-tuples of integer values. If the municipality can face the cost of any set of packages and has no further restrictions, all these K-tuples will also represent feasible choices.
Budgetary and political constraints will arise in many cases, though. Suppose that high levels of expenditure on all dimensions would exceed the budget, andÂor combinations of low levels would be politically unfeasible.
Let's examine in general this family of problems where
By considering only single-peaked preferences whose unconditional tops are feasible we implicitly assume that higher values for a characteristic imply a higher cost, but that citizens do not necessarily prefer the most expensive projects. In some cases, this assumption may be very restrictive.
Consider first the case of a budget constraint coming either from a restriction of a maximum or a minimum amount to spend. The intersection property is equivalent to Finally, a simple induction argument on K shows that the intersection property is equivalent to both inequalities. Now, start with the case where both restrictions are in effect at the same time. Using again the fact that Q 
Therefore a necessary condition is for K and n to satisfy the following inequality:
Thus, K must be smaller or equal than 2, which only leaves K=2 as an interesting case. By (2) with K=2, we have that n+2>Q l , then n has to be odd and Q l =Q l =(n+1)Â2. The above partial impossibility result is due, in part, to the strong restrictions of anonymity and neutrality imposed by voting by quota. It is possible to construct examples showing that, in general, we can find nontrivial generalized median voter schemes when there are maximum and minimum budget constraints and K>2.
THE STRUCTURE OF STRATEGY-PROOF SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS
We have learned how to construct feasibility preserving generalized median voter schemes. Results in this section show that, in fact, these are the only social choice functions guaranteeing strategy-proofness as long as voters are restricted to reveal single-peaked preferences on feasible alternatives.
There is a close formal parallelism between our results and those obtained in BarberaÁ , Gul and Stacchetti [2] for functions with Cartesian range. However, since we now deal with arbitrary ranges, we cannot rely on the same proofs, and we must also qualify our statements with reference to specific classes of preferences. We shall be interested in sets containing all single-peaked preferences with unconstrained top on some superset of the range. In the sequel, P will stand for a generic subset of P, closed on some set containing R F . In particular, remember that P =P(R F ) stands for the set of all single-peaked preferences with unconstrained top on the range R F . Theorem 3. If F : P n Ä B is a strategy-proof social choice function on P , then F is a generalized median voter scheme on R F .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Some salient facts on strategy-proof social choice functions emerge along the proof, and we highlight them here, in the form of Propositions 2 and 3, since they are of independent interest. First of all, strategy-proof social choice functions in our setting can only depend on each agent's preferred alternative on A (Proposition 2). Moreover (Proposition 3), they can be decomposed into separate procedures, one for each dimension (see Le Breton and Sen [11] ). Proposition 2. If F: P n Ä B is strategy-proof on P , then F is a voting scheme on R F (it is tops-only on R F ).
Proposition 3. If f : R n F Ä B is a strategy-proof voting scheme on P , then f is a generalized median voter scheme on R F .
The proof of Proposition 3 involves a careful examination of the power of coalitions under strategy-proof social choice functions. We provide the main idea of the proof in what follows.
Definition 13. Given a voting scheme f : R n F Ä R F , for each k= 1, 2, ..., K and every : k <b k (a k <: k ) we define the set of strong
What we have called a left (right)-coalition system assigns to every point in a one-dimensional box a collection of coalitions with a particular structure (properties (1), (2) and (3) in Definition 5). This concept is, a priori, independent of any voting scheme. On the other hand, the sets of weak or strong left (right) coalitions associated with an arbitrary voting scheme f need not satisfy conditions (1), (2) and (3), even if they are also collections of coalitions for every point in a one-dimensional box. Our proof of Proposition 3 consists in showing that whenever a voting scheme f is strategy proof on P , the sets of weak and strong left (right) coalitions defined by f coincide and are, in fact, a family of left (right) coalition systems (see Lemma 2 in the proof of Proposition 3).
We summarize the joint implications of Theorems 1, 2 and 3 in the following Corollary, which only applies when the tops of preferences belong to the feasible set.
Corollary 3. Let F : P(A)
n Ä A be an onto social choice function. Then F is strategy-proof on P(A) if and only if it is a generalized median voter scheme satisfying the Intersection Property.
THE GIBBARD SATTERTHWAITE THEOREM
In this section we show how to prove the Gibbard Satterthwaite Theorem as an implication of our results. This application is also presented as a proof of the strength of our theorems.
A set of agents, N=[1, 2, ..., n], must choose one alternative from a finite set K=[1, 2, ..., K] (K>2). We can still view this problem as a particular case of voting under constraints. To do that, we identify each alternative as one vector of the K-dimensional euclidean basis, and view the remaining vertices of the K-dimensional hypercube as conceivable but unfeasible alternatives. Having embedded our alternatives in R K , we now want to argue that the assumption that preferences are single-peaked on the K-dimensional hypercube and have tops on feasible alternatives imposes no restriction on the orderings of the K (feasible) alternatives since none of the vectors of the euclidean base lies on the minimal box between two other vectors of the same base (in fact, the L 1 -distance between any two of such vectors is always equal to two). Hence, we can apply our results on constrained voting to what in fact is the case considered by Gibbard Satterthwaite. We will see that one gets the dictator directly from the following two conditions of the intersection property:
(a) For every j=1, 2, ..., K, every r j # R j , and every k{ j,
.., and l K # L K , K j=1 l j {<. Let j and k be arbitrary ( j{k) and fix r j # R j . Condition (a) says that r j & r k {< for every r k # R k . By Proposition 1 we must have that r j # L k . Therefore R j L k for every j and k ( j{k). We want to show that the inclusions also hold in the other direction. Suppose not, there exists j and k ( j{k) and l k # L k such that l k Â R j . By Proposition 1 there must exist l j # L j such that l k & l j =<, contradicting condition (b). Therefore if K>2 the set of left and right coalitions are the same and coincide across the K dimensions. Notice that if K=2, then R 1 =L 2 and L 1 =R 2 , which does not imply that the generalized median voter scheme is dictatorial. Let
Next, we want to show that C only has one minimal set. implies that F & D${< for every D$ # C, and therefore, by Proposition 1, we have that F # C, which is a contradiction to the fact that D and E were minimal sets in C. Thus, there must be a unique minimal set in C. Call it D.
To get the dictator, we must show that >D=1. But this has to be the case, since i # D implies that 
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Since there is a bijection between right-coalition systems and generalized median voter schemes, it is sufficient to show that
. Since f is a generalized median voter scheme we have that
, but l(:~, ; k ) satisfies this condition since its complementary set is r(:~, ; k +1).
To prove the converse, let r(:~, ; k ) # R k *( ; k ) and r(:
Since f is a generalized median voter scheme we must have that [ f(:~)] k =; k .
Q.E.D.
be a subset of R K such that for every 1 t T and every 1 k K, v t k is equal to either 1, 0 or &1. Assume there exists 1 t T such that v t =(&1, 0, ..., 0).
T t=1 be a family of subsets of 2 N . Assume:
Proof
this can be done since the intersection of these two sets of unions is disjoint by hypothesis. Let 1 m K be arbitrary, and assume that v 1 m =1 (the argument for the other two cases is similar). By construction of the ! i 's,
m =< by hypothesis, and
m =< by hypothesis. Assume it is true for T, and 
For every i # C define ! i =v T+1 . Then for every k>1, 
=<, which proves the lemma. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1. Sufficiency: Voter's sovereignty on A implies that f(A n )$A. Therefore we must show that f (A n ) A. Assume f has the Intersection Property for every (:, S), and suppose f does not preserve feasibility; that is, there exists : Â A and ! # A n such that f (! )=:. Define S=[! 1 , ..., ! n ] and the sets C
Since f is a generalized median voter scheme we know that C
Therefore, by the distributive law between unions and intersections,
For every i # N, we have that
is equal to either:
(1) and (2) constitute a contradiction with the fact that there exists ! # S such that !=! j .
Necessity: We will show the contrapositive. Suppose f does not satisfy the intersection property. In order to apply the preceding lemma, we make the following transformation: for every 1 t T, define v t as follows
Define !(:)=(0, ..., 0) and
Thus, by the previous lemma there exist ! 1 , ..., ! n # V such that for every
Since f is a generalized median voter scheme we have that for every 1 k K, f k ( ; 1 , ..., ; n )=: k , which implies that there exists ; # A n such that f ( ; )=: Â A.
Theorem 3 follows from Propositions 2 and 3. Although it would be natural to first prove that we should restrict attention to voting schemes (Proposition 2) and then show that strategy-proof voting schemes must be generalized median voter schemes (Proposition 3), it is convenient to reverse this order. This is because the proof of Proposition 2 involves an induction argument on the number of agents, while Proposition 3 can be proved directly for any n, and its conclusion is used for the induction argument.
Lemma 2. For every :~# R n F , every k=1, ..., K and every ; k # B k
Proof. Sufficiency is obvious by the definition of l(: Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. To show that f is a generalized median voter scheme defined by L f one has just to establish the equivalence
since L f is a family of left-coalition systems. Let f (:~)=;. Consider l(:~, ; k ), which by construction belongs to
To show the other direction in the equivalence, notice that Lemma 2 establishes that [ f (:~)] k ; k for every k=1, 2, ..., K. It suffices to show that [ f (:~)] k ; k . This is because l(:
Lemma 2 used in the proof of Proposition 3 implies that the set of weak and strong left (right) coalitions at ; k are indeed the same.
Our next definition will be useful in the proof of Proposition 2, which follows a line of reasoning initiated in BarberaÁ and Peleg [1] .
Definition 14. For a social choice function F: P n Ä B, the set of options, given P i # P , is defined by
Proof of Proposition 2. By induction on n, the number of agents.
Step 1 (n=2): If F: P 2 Ä B is strategy-proof on P , then F is a voting scheme on R F .
Proof of Step 1. By repeatedly using the fact that for two person social choice functions, strategy proofness implies that for every profile (P 1 , P 2 ), F(P 1 , P 2 ) is the P 2 -maximal element on o F 2 (P 1 ) and also the P 1 -maximal element on o F 1 (P 2 ), it is easy to show that strategy proofness of F implies that if o F 2 (P 1 )=o F 2 (P$ 1 ) then F(P 1 , P 2 )=F(P$ 1 , P 2 ). Therefore, following similar techniques first introduced by BarberaÁ and Peleg [1] , we have that for all P 1 and P$ 1 in P
Step 2 (n>2): We want to show that if (P 1 , ..., P n ) # P n and (P$ 1 , ..., P$ n ) # P n are such that { R F (P i )={ R F (P$ i ) for every i # N, then F(P 1 , ..., P n )= F(P$ 1 , ..., P$ n ). The result is obtained by repeated use of the following lemma.
Lemma: If P 1 , P$ 1 # P are such that { R F (P 1 )={ R F (P$ 1 ), then for every (P 2 , ..., P n ) # P n&1 one has that F(P$ 1 , P 2 , ..., P n )=F(P 1 , P 2 , ..., P n ).
Proof of lemma.
. Proof of claim 1. Consider the function G: P 2 Ä B defined by G(P 1 , P 2 )=F(P 1 , P 2 , ..., P 2 ) for every (P 1 , P 2 ) # P 2 . It is easy to show that R F =R G and that F being strategy proof implies that G is also strategy proof. Therefore, we can use (see (3) above) that o G 2 (P 1 )=o G 2 (P$ 1 ) for every P 1 and P$ 1 with the same top on R F . Hence, it is sufficient to show that o
. To show the other inclusion suppose that there exists : such that F(P 1 , P 2 , ..., P n )=: Â o G 2 (P 1 ). For P # P (:), strategy proofness of F implies that F(P 1 , P, P 3 , ..., P n )=: because otherwise, agent 2 could manipulate at this profile. One gets the result by replacing sequentially P for P i (i>2).
Claim 2. F(P$ 1 , P 2 , ..., P n )=F(P 1 , P 2 , ..., P n ).
Proof of claim 2. By induction on n. If n=2, strategy proofness implies that agent 2 maximizes over the option set left by agent 1, and therefore if the sets of options are the same, F has to take the same value. Now, suppose the induction hypothesis holds for n&1, but not for n. Then, there exist (P 2 , ..., P n ) # P n&1 such that F(P$ 1 , P 2 , ..., P n )=:${:=F(P 1 , P 2 , ..., P n ).
Define, for all P 1 # P , F P 1 : P n&1 Ä B by F P 1 (P 2 , ..., P n )=F(P 1 , P 2 , ..., P n ). Denote F P 1 and F P 1 , by G and G$ respectively. Since F is strategy proof on P , G and G$ are strategy-proof on P . Clearly R G =R G$ , since R G = o F &1 (P 1 )=o F &1 (P$ 1 )=R G$ . Since P $P(R F ) and R F $R G we have that P(R G ) P(R F ) P . By the induction hypothesis G and G$ are tops only on R G . Therefore G and G$ can be considered functions from (R G ) n&1 to R G , which are strategy-proof on P $P(R G ). Our contradiction hypothesis implies that there exist : 2 , ..., : n # R G , : i ={ RG (P i ) for i=2, ..., n, such that G(: 2 , ..., : n )=:{:$=G$(: 2 , ..., : n ). Proposition 3 implies that G and G$ are generalized median voter schemes. Since :{:$, we can assume that there exists K k 1 such that : k >:
where L$ k and L k (R$ k and R k ) are the left (right) coalitions associated to G$ and G, respectively. Let ;={ R F (P 1 )={ R F (P$ 1 ). Either :$ k <; k or ; k <: k . We are going to obtain a contradiction for the first case using the left coalition system; the second case is similar using the right coalition system. Let '= (' 2 , ..., ' n ) where ' i =:$ if i # l and ' i =; if i Â l. Then, since G is a generalized median voter scheme, G(') # MB(:$, ;), [G(')] k >:$ k and [G$(')] k =:$ k . We are going to obtain, first, a contradiction for the case where ;={(P 1 )={(P$ 1 ) # R F , and then, using this fact, obtain a contradiction for the general case. Assume that ;={(P 1 )={(P$ 1 ) # R F . If G$(')=:$ there exist P i # P(' i ) for i>1 such that F(P 1 , P 2 , ..., P n ) P$ 1 F(P$ 1 , P 2 , ..., P n ) which contradicts strategy-proofness of F. If G$('){:$ replace in the above argument :$ by G$('). Since G$(') was an element of MB(:$ . Then, there exist P i # P('Ä i ) for i>1 such that G('Ä )=F(P 1 , P 2 , ..., P n ) P$ 1 F(P$ 1 , P 2 , ..., P n )=G$('Ä ) which contradicts strategy-proofness of F. Assume now that ;={ R F (P 1 )={ R F (P$ 1 ) # R F . By the same argument just used above we can identify a 'Ä =('Ä 2 , ..., 'Ä n ) # (R G ) n&1 where 'Ä i =# if i # l, 'Ä i =; if i Â l, # k =:$ k , G$('Ä )=# and G('Ä ) # MB(#, ;)&[#]. Consider any P 1 , P $ 1 # P(;) and let G and G $ be the associated generalized median voter schemes on P n&1 once P 1 and P $ 1 are fixed. We have just seen that in this case, G and G $ coincide, hence G ('Ä )=G $('Ä ) # MB(G$('Ä ), ;). We must have that G('Ä ) Â MB(G ('Ä ), ;), otherwise it would contradict strategy proofness of F, since F(P 1 , P 2 , ..., P n ) P 1 F(P 1 , P 2 , ..., P n ) for P i # P('Ä i ) for i>1. Therefore, there exists P 1 # P( ;) (and its associated G ) such that ;P 1 G('Ä ) P 1 G ('Ä ). Now, G ('Ä )=G $('Ä )=G ('Ä ) and therefore we obtain the contradiction of strategy proofness of F since G('Ä )=F(P 1 , P 2 , ..., P n ) P 1 F(P 1 , P 2 , ..., P n )=G ('Ä ) for P i # P('Ä i ) for i>1.
Theorem 2 follows trivially from Propositions 5, 6 and 7 below. Proof. Let f be a generalized median voter scheme. Necessity is trivial. To show sufficiency, assume that there exists S A such that f does not have the intersection property for (:, S). Then f does not also have the intersection property for (:, S _ S ). Since S is crucial, every v # S&S is redundant for S , therefore, by Proposition 1, f does not have the intersection property for (:, S _ S &[v]). We can keep subtracting from the union elements in S&S until we obtain that f does not have the intersection property for (:, S ).
